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PUTTING THE BRAKES ON
DRIVE-THROUGH DELIVERIES
A mother delivers a newborn baby. What image does this bring to
mind? A hospital room filled with flowers, with mother and baby sharing
a "leisurely week" 1 recuperating at the hospital? Think again. The
Center for Disease Control reports that the median length of stay for
women who give birth vaginally decreased between 1970 and 1992 from
3.9 to 2.1 days, and for cesarean births from 7.8 to 4 days.2 This reflects a
general decrease in the length of stay that has continued over the last two
decades.3 Before the 1970's, postpartum hospital stays for vaginal births
varied from four to five days, and between one to two weeks for cesarean
deliveries.4 This trend has earned the infamous nickname "drive through
deliveries."'
The inclination toward earlier discharge began in the 1970's,6 and is
attributed to consumer demands that childbirth be more family oriented.7
It should be noted that early discharge in the 1970's quite often "involved
small, select groups of women who wanted to decrease the medical inter-
vention[] surround[ing] childbirth."8 In addition, states in which health
maintenance organizations or managed-care health plans dominated the
health insurance industry shifted to earlier discharges in the 1980's.9
Postpartum hospital stays are targeted for reduction by the insurance in-
dustry because obstetrical delivery is the most frequent cause of hospitali-
zation in the United States.10 Fueled by the recent evidence of the effects
1. Daniel Q. Haney, Insurance Forcing New Moms Home Prematurely, CHARLESTON
GAZETrE, June 5, 1995, at 1A.
2. The Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 969
Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(testimony of Dr. Michael Mennuti, Chairman, American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists) [hereinafter "Senate Hearings"].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Sandra G. Boodman, Discharged Too Soon?, WASH. POST, June 27,1995, (Health),
at 10.
6. id.
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id.
9. Thomas Maier, Speedy Delivery, NEWSDAY, June 12, 1995, at A5, A21.
10. Boodman, supra note 5, at 10. U.S. Representative Robert Torricelli of New
Jersey recently calculated that for the approximate 4 million births in the United States per
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of early dismissal, the decrease in hospital stays has alarmed patients,
doctors, and lawmakers, and resulted in legislation that would impose
mandatory minimum hospital stays for newborns and mothers."1
Treatable infant diseases are on the rise in the United States. On May
8, 1995, the American Pediatric Society ("APS") released a study that
found an increase in the number of newborns readmitted to hospitals for
jaundice over the last two years. 12 Jaundice is caused by the buildup of a
toxic yellow substance in the blood and tissue of a newborn. 3 Jaundice
occurs in approximately one third of all newborns, and it takes about sev-
enty-two hours to reach its peak.' 4 Between 1972 and 1991, only one case
of advanced infant jaundice was discovered in twenty-three hospitals sur-
veyed by Dr. Augusto Sola, the author of the APS study. 5 However, he
found five advanced cases of jaundice occurring in just one San Francisco
hospital between 1992 and 1994.16 Most of the infants were discharged
from the hospital after twenty-four hours, but upon readmittance-due to
the jaundice-stayed between two and ten days. 17
This Comment examines the recent legislation concerning minimum
hospital stays for newborns and mothers. First, this Comment reviews the
traditional practice of physician-determined hospital stays and the mod-
ern approach toward managed care providers. Second, this Comment
presents the latest legislative approach to confronting the issue of mini-
mum hospital stays for newborns and mothers and argues that the legisla-
tion is a natural result of modern trends in health care in the United
States. Also, this Comment explores the impact that federal legislation
has on state legislation. Finally, this Comment concludes that the trend
year, every day taken off of the postpartum stay (assuming an average cost of $1,000 per
bed), insurers save $4 billion a year. Senate Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony of Palma E.
Formica, M.D. of the American Medical Association ("AMA")).
11. See IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-25-5 (Burns 1996), N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216 (McKinney
1996), GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-58.1 (1996).
12. Maier, supra note 9, at A21.
13. Prepared statement of Dr. Lillian R. Blackmon, former president of the Maryland
Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, in support of Maryland Senate Bill 677
(Feb. 28, 1995).
14. Id. See also 2 P. DENNERY & D. K. STEVENSON, DISEASES OF THE FETUS AND
NEWBORN § 100.1.2, at 1454 (G.B. Reed et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995) (explaining that bilirubin
levels frequently increase in the first few days of life, followed by a rapid decline).
15. Maier, supra note 9, at A21. Dr. Sola is the director of neonatal clinical services at
the University of California at San Francisco. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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will continue appropriately in other states and most likely on the federal
level.
I. PLANTING THE SEED FOR MINIMUM STAYS
A. Physician Alliance Results in Recommendations
Noting the trend toward early dismissal, "a consensus formed among
obstetric care providers based on clinical experience that the optimal
length of stay should be no less than forty-eight hours generally."' 8 As a
result, the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists joined together to publish their first rec-
ommendations for postpartum hospital stays in 1983, entitled "Guidelines
for Perinatal Care" ("Guidelines").19 The Guidelines noted that patients
who experienced uncomplicated deliveries usually were discharged forty-
eight to seventy-two hours after birth2" and recommended that the pa-
tient should be discharged when "the physician is reasonably certain
[that] there are no major postpartum complications."21 Initially, the
Guidelines only addressed hospital stays for vaginal births.22
In 1988, the Guidelines 23 incorporated postpartum hospital stays for
cesarean births, recommending "96 hours.., excluding the day of deliv-
ery.",24 The most recent edition of the Guidelines25 maintains the same
recommendation for a forty-eight hour stay following a vaginal birth with
no complications, and ninety-six hours for cesarean deliveries. 26 The cur-
rent Guidelines, however, call for additional criteria to be met, such as a
determination that the pregnancy, as well as the delivery, was uncompli-
cated.27 The alliance also recommends the collection of certain labora-
tory data for both the mother and infant, continuing medical care for the
mother and child directed by a physician, and a demonstration that the
18. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 53 (testimony of Michael Mennuti, M.D.).
19. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS & THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRI-
CIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR PERINATAL CARE XXiii (1983).
20. Id. at 89.
21. Id.
22. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 53 (testimony of Michael Mennuti, M.D.).
23. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS & AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS
AND GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR PERINATAL CARE (2d ed. 1988).
24. Id. at 100.
25. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS & AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS
AND GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR PERINATAL CARE (3d ed. 1992).
26. Id. at 107.
27. Id.
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mother is ready to assume care for the infant.2" In essence, the policy-
making decisions of dismissal times were left mostly in the hands of the
practitioners. The one other significant group that has had a major influ-
ence, however, is the insurers.
B. A History of Insurance Coverage in the United States
Few Americans enjoyed health insurance early in this century. In 1940,
for example, fewer than ten percent of Americans had access to health
insurance coverage.29 After World War II, private health insurance be-
gan to take hold, most often utilizing the traditional fee-for-service ar-
rangement. 30 Today, Tennessee and Hawaii lead the nation with about
ninety4our percent of their population covered by some form of health
insurance.31
Fee-for-service insurance still exists,32 but is often subject to measures
designed to control costs, such as "utilization reviews." These reviews
assess the need for hospitalization or surgery, or specify certain proce-
dures for testing diseases.3 3 Utilization review is an external evaluation
by third-party payors or health care organizers that evaluate the appro-
priateness of treatment based on established clinical criteria.' Such
measures allow the insurer to keep its costs down, but also limit the treat-
ment options of doctors and patients.
Since the mid-1970's, health care in the United States has changed dra-
matically, from the traditional fee-for-service insurance programs to
health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") and preferred provider or-
ganizations ("PPOs"). 35 HMOs receive insurance premiums from in-
sureds at the start of the year in exchange for a promise to provide
medical services throughout the year.36 There are two main types of
28. Id. at 108-09.
29. Burton A. Weisbrod, The Health Care Quadrilemma: An Essay on Technological
Change, Insurance, Quality of Care and Cost Containment, 29 J. ECON. Lrr. 523,523 (1991):
30. Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be On
American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1359 (1994).
31. Steven Findlay, Getting Tough on Managed Care, Bus. & HEALTH, Dec., 1995, at
54. Tennessee has the highest number of insured residents: 94.2% of Tennessee. residents
are covered by private insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, or military programs. Id.
32. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1362.
33. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Insurers Second-Guess Doctors, Provoking Debate Over Sav-
ings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1993, at Al, A22.
34. John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review
and Case Management, 26 Hous. L. REV. 191, 192-93 (1989).
35. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1362.
36. Id. at 1362-63.
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HMOs: (1) the "staff model," where the HMO hires its own physicians as
salaried employees,37 and (2) the independent physician association
("IPA") model, where the HMO contracts with many physicians in in-
dependent offices.38 PPOs are a network of area providers that agree to
charge lower rates for their services in exchange for attracting a greater
number of patients.3 9 HMOs and PPOs also practice cost containment
measures such as utilization reviews and precertification requirements
before admission to the hospital.4" Naturally, physicians are affected by
this change in the American health care system.
One positive aspect of the fee-for-service plan is the financial incentive
it creates for the development of new technology, thereby advancing
available medical treatment. However, this can also lead to higher health
care costs. 41 In the fee-for-service model, doctors and patients often do
not need to concern themselves with the cost of a particular course of
medical treatment because a third party (the insurer) bears the immedi-
ate cost.42 Traditionally, physicians are not taught to concern themselves
with the, costs of medical care when evaluating a patient's health.43 Also,
the treating physician makes treatment decisions based on her first-hand
knowledge of the patient, rather than an off-site administrator making
such decisions.
There are some drawbacks to fee-for-service plans. One such draw-
back is that doctors often conduct their own tests and procedures. Conse-
quently, doctors may gain a financial benefit from ordering as many
procedures as possible, including those that are not really necessary. 44 In
fact, according to one physician, "'[tihe incentives [are] to keep people in
the hospital, to perform more tests and procedures, to increase costs."' 45
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. HCA Health Serv. of Va. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 120, 122 (4th Cir.
1992).
. 40. See Blum, supra note 34, at 192-93; Susan M.C. Payne, Identifying and Managing
Inappropriate Hospital Utilization: A Policy Synthesis, 22 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 709, 711
(1987).
41. See Weisbrod, supra note 29, at 528, 536.
42. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1360-61.
43. Id. at 1360. See also Philip Caper, M.D., The Meaning of Quality in Medical Care,
291 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1136 (1974); Norman G. Levinsky, M.D., The Doctor's Master, 311
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573 (1984); Jan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, Cutting Waste by
Making Rules: Promises, Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1563
(1992).
44. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1362.
45. Gregg Easterbrook, The Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1987, at 43.
1997]
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Modern cost containment methods bring the impact of medical costs
closer to home for physicians. For example, under HMOs, physicians
often are paid on a capitation basis, 6 they receive a fixed amount for
each of their patients covered by the HMO.47 Therefore, any service the
patient receives reduces the physician's net revenues.48 Another mecha-
nism is withholding a portion of the physician's annual salary so that she
receives it at the end of the year, only if costs are below a predetermined
limit.49 PPOs employ similar means, such as reviewing its list of provid-
ers and removing any physicians whose tests and services take them
outside of the desired financial range."
Utilization review provides substantial savings for managed care insur-
ance companies. 1 Utilization review usually occurs in three ways:
preadmission, concurrent review, and retrospective review. 2 Preadmis-
sion or precertification generally requires advance authorization for cer-
tain methods of treatment or hospitalization.5 3  Concurrent review
generally manages the length of treatment, most often lengths of hospital
stays.5 4 Retrospective review is a remedial measure that examines a phy-
sician's practices or particular methods of treatment for cost-effective-
ness.55 In conjunction, the three methods provide ample opportunity for
an insurance provider to oversee its services.
II. COST CONTAINMENT MEASURES: LIMITING HOSPITAL STAYS
Neither insurance system is perfect-"[t]he problem with ... fee-for-
service medicine [is] that the incentive [is] to do more.... [But] capita-
tion['s] incentive is to do less."'56 One cost-cutting measure is to limit the
46. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1364-65. See also W. Pete Welch et al., Toward New
Typologies for HMOs, 68 MILBANK Q. 221, 224-25 (1990).
47. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 1365.
48. Id.
49. W. Pete Welch et al., supra note 46, at 226-27.
50. Ron Winslow & Edward Felsenthal, Physicians Fight Back as Insurers Cut Them
from Health Networks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1993, at A5. See also HCA Health Serv. of
Va. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1992) (concerning three hospitals
that brought suit alleging that their exclusion from a local PPO violated state statutes).
51. Rex O'Neal, Safe Harbor for Health Care Cost Containment, 43 STAN. L. REV. 399,
406-07 (1991). "Prospective utilization review [has had] an eight-to-one savings-to-cost ra-
tio." Id. at 407.
52. Payne, supra note 40.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Marilyn Chase, Rationed Health Care Helps Oregon's Poor But Real Test Is Ahead,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1994, at A6.
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patient's stay following initial hospitalization. This can happen in a
number of situations. For example, in Wickline v. State,57 the plaintiff
underwent surgery on her leg and required hospitalization.58 The physi-
cian requested an additional hospital stay of eight days, but the insurance
company only authorized four days, after which the patient was
discharged.59
Over a period of several days after her release, the plaintiff's leg gave
her extreme pain and turned a mottled color.6" She was ordered back to
the hospital nine days after her release, at which time an above the knee
amputation was performed due to excessive blood clotting.61 At a trial
on the merits, the plaintiff won a jury verdict in her favor.62 On appeal,
the California Court of Appeals for the Second District noted that "this
case appear[ed] to be the first attempt to tie a health care payor into the
medical malpractice causation chain and that it, therefore, deal[t] with
issues of profound importance to the health care community and to the
general public." 63
In his opinion, Justice Rowen noted that "public and private payors
have in recent years experimented with a variety of cost containment
mechanisms." '  In particular, this case concerned the use of a prospec-
tive utilization review process that required authorization before medical
care could be received. Although the attending physician requested addi-
tional time in the hospital, once the utilization review administrators (a
nurse and a physician) returned the request and allowed only four days,
no other request was made.65 The court found that the insurer was not
negligent because the four-day discharge met the "pertinent standard of
care," and that the ultimate decision to discharge is made by the
physician.66
Notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the insurer, the Wickline court,
in dicta, noted the potential risk of such cost containment measures. "[I]t
is essential that [cost containment] not be permitted to corrupt medical
judgment" and "patient[s] who require treatment and [are] harmed when
57. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
58. d at 812.
59. Id. at 813-14.
60. Id. at 816.
61. Id. at 816-17.
62. Id. at 811.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 815.
66. Id. at 819-20.
19971
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care which should have been provided is not provided should recover...
from all those responsible ... including, when appropriate, health care
payors" and cost containment providers, in cases of unreasonable deci-
sion-making practices. 67 In Wickline, none of the three hospital physi-
cians made a second request for additional days. The court declined to
impose liability on the insurer where "the physician who complies with-
out protest with the limitations imposed by a third party payor, when his
medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid ultimate responsibility
for his patient's care.",6
8
Courts are ill-equipped to take utilization review into account in the
context of retrospective review. Physicians often must keep their costs
down to avoid a reduction in pay or being purged from the list of provid-
ers. Thus, physicians must balance the benefits of further treatment for
their patients against the costs associated with such treatments and how
those costs are reflected on the physician in retrospective review.
Shortly after Wickline, a similar case arose in California. In Wilson v.
Blue Cross of Southern California, a patient was hospitalized due to se-
vere depression, drug dependency, and anorexia.69 Shortly after his re-
lease, the patient committed suicide and his family brought a wrongful
death action against their son's insurer, Blue Cross, and in' particular, its
utilization review provider.70 The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs did not have a
valid claim. On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded.71
The victim's physician sought to have the patient hospitalized for four
weeks.72 However, Blue Cross declined to pay for more than ten days,
and the victim's family could not afford to pay for the hospitalization.73
The decision to deny coverage in this case again was a result of a utiliza-
tion review process. The appellate court held that upon remand, no pub-
lic policy immunizes utilization review contractors from liability for its
decisions." The case went to trial, but the plaintiff settled with the utili-
zation review provider, and no legal result was reached.75 This is not the
67. Id. at 820.
68. Id. at 819.
69. Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
70. Id. at 878, 880.
71. Id. at 885.
72. Id. at 877-78.
73. Id.
74. Id at 884.
75. See Milt Freudenheim, When Treatment and Costs Collide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
1992, at D2.
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only type of case concerning hospital discharges. As parents seek addi-
tional days of hospitalization for the mother and newborn infant, the po-
tential for additional suits against utilization review providers arises.
Recently, the parents of a New York infant filed a ten million dollar
suit against their insurer, U.S. Healthcare, and the hospital where the
child was .born.7 6 The infant was discharged from the hospital twenty-
four hours after his birth, but on his second day at home, his parents said
his breathing became labored and his skin "looked blotchy.",77 Upon re-
admission, doctors discovered that the infant had a serious heart defect
and he died as a result. The boy's mother charged, "On my son's death
certificate, it should read - 'Cause of Death: Lack of Insurance Coverage'
.... We feel devastated by our loss and bitter toward a senseless policy
that failed our son miserably.",78 The parents believe that their son's de-
fect would have been detected sooner if their insurance plan provided for
maternity stays of three or more days, as the plan did two years earlier.79
The outcome of the claim remains open, as no trial date or settlement is
set.
When interviewed by The New York Times about the case, Dr. Nancy
Bridges, a pediatric cardiologist at Philadelphia's Children's Hospital,
said "serious heart problems like [this infant's] afflict about one or two
children in every 1,000 births." 80 She noted that babies should not be
kept unnecessarily in the hospital, "[b]ut' if a child like this were in the
hospital for a little longer, [the heart problem] likely would have been
caught." 81 Three physicians contacted by Newsday stated that the symp-
toms of the condition that this infant suffered from "are difficult to see on
the first day [of life], but are often picked up on the second or third
day.82
The news media is full of accounts of similar incidents.83 In fact, even
76. Thomas Maier, Symptoms of Danger Slow to Show, NEWSDAY, June 12, 1995, at
A5, A20.
77. Id. at A20.
78. Id. at A5, A20.
79. Id. The infant's problem was hypoplastic left heart syndrome, an underdevelop-
ment of the heart's left ventricle. About 50% of children with this defect survive after
surgery, according to pediatric heart specialists at another New York hospital. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. Another specialist noted, however, that "[it's difficult to say whether the 24-
hour discharge delayed diagnosis in [the infant's] case, or whether a delay in diagnosis led
to his death." Id.
82. Id.
83. See e.g., Robert L. Jackson, Baby's Death Focuses Senators on Question of Hospital
Stays, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at A5; Julie Miller, Mother and Newborn: How Long in
19971
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First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton wrote in her syndicated column about
her experience during childbirth.' She recounted her difficulty in learn-
ing to breast feed and the nurses' instructions that helped her during her
stay in the hospital after a cesarean section.85 Her article included stories
of several other women who experienced difficulties in obtaining insur-
ance approval for additional days in the hospital, and the death of one
child as a result of a treatable infection.86 Recent studies are beginning to
confirm these anecdotal accounts.
Specifically, Dartmouth Medical School conducted research to deter-
mine if the early dismissals increased the risk of hospital readmission and
visits to the emergency room within the first two weeks of life for infants
who were discharged after less than forty-eight hours in the hospital. 87
This study revealed that the risk of readmission increased by fifty percent,
and the risk of an emergency room visit increased by seventy percent. 88
Another study published in Pediatrics found that the Guidelines for
Perinatal Care remains the standard for early infant discharge, but that
the available information is limited.89 The study noted that only three
previous randomized studies "provide information regarding the medical
safety of early discharge." 90 Those studies contained varying discharge
times, a relatively small numbers of infants, and differing follow-up peri-
ods that made comparison difficult.9' Acknowledging that "the superior-'
ity of a longer hospitalization . . . has not been established," the
researchers recommended that in the absence of definitive medical data,
the decision to discharge apparently healthy term newborns should be
left to the practitioner, based upon her first-hand knowledge of the medi-
cal, social, and economic aspects of each case.9 2
There are several treatable diseases in newborns that call for this level
the Hospital?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, (Conn. Weekly), at 1; Della De Lafuente, Hospi-
tals to Moms: Give Birth and Go, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 18, 1995, at 1; Diana K. Sugg,
Giving Moms, Newborns More Time in the Hospital, BALT. SUN, Apr. 24, 1995, at 1A.
84. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Congratulations Mom, But Out You Go; Your Insurance
Coverage has Now Expired, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Oct. 2, 1995, at All.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 22 Pen. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 2065 (Sept. 18, 1995). Dartmouth's study
focused on 15,000 annual births that occurred in New Hampshire.
88. Id.
89. John R. Britton, M.D., Ph.D. et al., Early Discharge of the Term Newborn: A Con-
tinued Dilemma, 94 PEDIATRICS 291 (1994).
90. Id. at 293.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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of caution. First, jaundice, the buildup of toxins within a newborn, is a
relatively common occurrence.93 When left untreated, jaundice advances
to kernicterus, which can lead to permanent brain damage or death. 94 A
second complication is dehydration, which may seem relatively harmless,
but can have serious consequences. 95 Dehydration usually results when
the baby and mother have difficulty in adapting to breast feeding. 96 This
can lead to insufficient milk syndrome, where a child eventually can be-
come mentally impaired and suffer neurological damage.97 A third dis-
ease that can be treated effectively with an. early diagnosis is
phenylketonuria ("PKU"). 98 PKU is genetic and occurs because of a he-
reditary absence of the enzyme necessary to break down an amino acid,
phenylalanine. 99 The test to determine whether PKU is present is most
reliable when given twenty-four hours after the infant's first feeding.'
PKU can be treated with a low-protein diet that prevents the severe brain
damage associated with an untreated case. 10 1 In fact, a recent survey con-
ducted by Children's Hospital of Philadelphia found that the widespread
practice of discharging infants twenty-four hours after vaginal delivery
increased the number of infants at risk for PKU. 10 2
Because follow-up visits for retesting within the first month of life are
required only in thirteen states, many early discharge infants are not
properly screened. 0 3 Simple infections can affect both the mother and
infant.0 4 Early dismissal may mean that these and other problems are
93. See Jose E. Becerra, M.D., M.P.H. et al., Morbidity Estimates of Conditions
Originating in the Perinatal Period: United States, 1986 Through 1987, 88 PEDIATRICS 553,
554-57 (1991) ("[Jlaundice is believed to be present during the first week of life in approxi-
mately 60% of full-term neonates and 80% of preterm neonates."); DENNERY & STEVEN-
SON, supra note 14, at 1453, 1454; Boodman, supra note 5, at 12.
94. Boodman, supra note 5.
95. Boodman, supra note 5, at 12.
96. Id.
97. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 56-57 (testimony of Palma E. Formica, M.D. of
the AMA).
98. Joan Beck, Babies Will Point Out the Failures of Cheap Health Care, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 22, 1995, at 21. PKU is a genetic disease, inherited from the parents' recessive genes,
and adjusting the baby's diet can avoid the severe brain damage that will follow without
treatment. THOMAS L. STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIC71ONARY 1348 (26th ed. 1995).
99. Horvath v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 704 S.W.2d 866, 867 (1985).
100. Beck, supra note 98.
101. Horvath, 704 S.W.2d at 868. See also Beck, supra note 98.
102. Sandra G. Boodman, Early-Discharge Infants Risk Metabolic Disorder, WASH.
POST, Dec. 19, 1995, (Health), at 5.
103. Id.
104. Testimony of Ruth Manchester, Health Issues Chair of the Maryland Chapter of
the American Association of University Women, in front of the Maryland House, for HB
1997]
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not discovered in time or cannot effectively be diagnosed. °5
One other complication is that family structure in American society is
different now than it was earlier in this century. Traditionally, families
created a network for new parents, whereas "'[t]oday, the mother is usu-
ally working and needs to get back to her job."' 10 6
Adequate home health care and an individualized assessment of a fam-
ily may fulfill the needs of a family with a newborn. The benefits of tai-
lored home health care were demonstrated recently by a study of low
birth weight infants. A Canadian study of low birth weight infants found
that earlier discharge of infants was feasible.10 7 Low birth weight infants,
however, normally are not dismissed within forty-eight or ninety-six
hours. Rather, these infants usually are kept in the hospital until they
reach a certain weight. In the Canadian study, dismissal of low birth
weight infants occurred when infants met certain readiness criteria, rather
than reaching a certain weight.' 0 8
What made this project successful was the individualized follow-up
care each family received, including teaching and support services, as well
as telephone or home visits of thirty to sixty minutes, during which the
nurse assessed the health of the infant and the social structure and physi-
cal environment of the family.' 019 The nurse could be contacted by the
family twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, while experienced
homemakers provided additional support and training."0 Families par-
ticipated in assessing their needs for home nursing and trained commu-
888. Mothers can experience infections at the point of incision for episiotomies or
cesarean sections and infants experience infections of the cord. Id.
105. Boodman, supra note 5, at 12.
"Jaundice doesn't start to happen until the second or third day of life, and dehy-
dration never happens until after two to five days .... Certain infections and
serious heart defects also do not show up during the first 24 hours and may occur
after babies go home. Early discharges also mean that babies are being sent
home before certain tests can be performed, such as the screening for .
phenylketonuria (PKU).
Id. (quoting Dr. Augusto Sola, Chief of Neonatal Clinical Services at the University of
California, San Francisco).
106. Miller, supra note 83, at 1 (quoting Dr. Michael R. Tesoro, Assistant Director of
Obstetrics and Gynecology at St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center in Hartford, Conn.).
107. Oscar G. Casiro, M.D. et al., Earlier Discharge With Community-Based Interven-
tion for Low Birth Weight Infants: A Randomized Trial, 92 PEDIATRICS 128 (1993).
108. Id. at 129. It should be noted that Canada has a nationwide, publicly funded
healthcare system. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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nity personnel visits.11' The researchers concluded that the
individualized community-based program for low birth weight infants was
cost-effective." 2
III. LAWMAKERS TAKE A STAND
Spurred by anecdotal accounts and urged by physicians, lawmakers on
the state level have taken swift action; already several states have enacted
legislation that requires mandatory minimum hospital stays for newborns
and mothers. Currently, just under half of the states have passed legisla-
tion that mandates minimum stays, either by the number of hours per
stay or mandating that the Guideline criteria be followed." 3 Similar leg-
islation is pending in several other states. 14 Maryland was one of the
first states to enact such legislation." 5 Maryland Senator Delores G. Kel-
ley testified that:
[D]ischarge decisions are often based solely upon economic and
insurance considerations, instead of upon clinical criteria estab-
lished by the American Academy of Pediatrics and by the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists [Guide-
lines for Perinatal Care]. Hospital discharges which are too
early, also prevent adequate newborn-screening for certain he-
reditary disorders which if unrecognized and untreated for more
than two weeks can lead to severe mental retardation of the
infant."
6
The Maryland chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics found
that there is "no data to substantiate that all of the mothers and babies
can successfully leave with very early discharges" and that "Maryland's
rate of insufficient milk feedings [which lead to physical and mental com-
plications for the infant]. . . has gone from 5% in 1989, to 30% in
1993."' 117 The Maryland bill requires insurance companies to assist par-
ents in selecting a primary care physician for their newborn, and provide
111. Id. at 128.
112. Id.
113. Those states are: Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.1 114. Diane West, Maternity Stay Issue Won't Be Getting Early Discharge, NAT'L UN-
DERWRITER, Jan. 1, 1996, at 4.
115. 1995 MD S.B. 677, Enacted May 25, 1995.
116. Testimony of Senator Delores G. Kelley before the Maryland Senate Finance
Committee hearing on the Mother's and Infants Health Security Act, S.B. 677 (March 9,
1995).
117. Prepared testimony of the Maryland Chapter of the American Academy of Pediat-
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those parents with information on postpartum home visits before the date
of delivery."1 The bill also utilizes the Guidelines for Perinatal Care in'
establishing minimum stays of forty-eight hours for vaginal births and
ninety-six hours for cesarean births.1 9 The bill has an "opt-out" clause,
however, allowing for the authorization of shorter stays if the newborn
meets the criteria for medical stability as stated in the Guidelines, and if
the utilizations review agent "authorizes a sufficient number of postpar-
tum home visits" or an HMO "authorizes for the mother and child an
initial postpartum home visit which include[s] the collection of an ade-
quate sample for the hereditary and metabolic newborn screening, when
indicated."' 20
The New Jersey and North Carolina legislatures also used the Guide-
lines for Perinatal Care when they enacted laws regarding minimum hos-
pital stays, and provided an "opt-out" clause for "a hospital service
corporation contract that provides post-delivery care to a mother and her
newly born child in the home."'' In other words, an insurer may send a
mother and newborn home, after a vaginal delivery, before forty-eight
hours, provided there is a home visit.
New Jersey lawmakers heard testimony from one man whose niece lost
her child to a treatable infection after she was dismissed from the hospital
within twenty-four hours. Her insurance carrier provided for a home visit
from a health care provider, but the family did not receive a visit. 122 The
nurse was supposed to visit the family on the second day but never ar-
rived. When the family asked why the nurse had not visited, they discov-
ered that the nurse did not know the child was born.
In the case of the Jones family,' 23 a home-care nurse came to the fam-
ily's home three days after their son was born. The nurse informed Mrs.
Jones "that Bryan had mild jaundice and a weak grasp with his fingers,
but was otherwise fine.' 24 Later that day, Bryan's breathing and color
alarmed his mother and she called her pediatrician and brought him to
the hospital.' 25 Essentially, the Jones family received the services pro-
rics before the Maryland Senate Finance Committee, S.B. 677, 2d Sess., Maryland (Mar. 9,
1995).
118. S.B. 677, 2d Sess., Maryland (1995).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 1994 N.J. A.B. 2224, 2d Sess., New Jersey (1995).
122. Id. (testimony of Dominick A. Ruggiero, Jr.).
123. Maier, supra note 76.
124. Id.
125. Id.
Drive-Through Deliveries
vided for in the "opt-out" clauses of the new legislation, which is some
indication that this measure may not be a sufficient precaution to protect
the health of a mother and her newborn. If a nurse visits too soon after
an infant's release, it may be too early to diagnose problems such as
PKU. Jaundice may go untreated for too long, however, if a nurse does
not visit early enough.
Similar legislation is pending in several states such as Wisconsin, Penn-
sylvania, Illinois, Kansas, Georgia, and New Hampshire.' 26 New York
state should pass legislation by the end of February 1996. However, in
California and Rhode Island, similar legislation failed to come to a vote,
effectively ending the measure from the previous session, although the
legislation is still pending. Ironically, Kaiser Permanente began sending
mothers and newborns home as early as eight hours after delivery at one
of their Los Angeles facilities. 127
Not surprisingly, this issue reached the federal level shortly after it
gained popularity in the states. 128 Former Senators Nancy Kassebaum
and Bill Bradley were co-sponsors of The New Borns' and Mothers'
Health Protection Act of 1995.129 The language of the bill is nearly iden-
tical to the measures passed in Maryland and New Jersey. Senator Brad-
ley testified before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources that the recent accounts of mothers and newborns being dis-
charged quickly from hospitals are not isolated incidents, and when they
are looked at together "these tales show a consistent pattern of mothers
and newborns being denied the care they need.' 130 Senator Bradley
noted that although several states passed or are considering passing simi-
126. West, supra note 114, at 4.
127. David R. Olmos, Early-Release Policy at HMOs Draws Fire, L.A. TIMES, June 16,
1995, at D12. The trend towards early release has been called "an uninformed experi-
ment." Id.
128. Hospitals have risen to the occasion with many hospitals allowing and advertising
for a free additional day of postpartum stay for newborns and their mothers. See Diane
West, Hospitals Giving Moms Extra Day Free, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 9, 1995, at 3
("'If your Health Plan does not cover this amount of time in the hospital.., our gift to you
will."' (quoting advertisement of St. John's Riverside Hospital)); Stephanie L. Stein, Chal-
lenge to HMO's Maternity Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, (Long Island Weekly), at 9
("'University Hospital ... was taking on health insurers companies [sic] by allowing
mothers and their newborns extended maternity stays."'); Amy Goldstein, GWU Hospital
to Offer Longer Maternity Stay, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1995, at B1, B7 ("We did this for
strictly medical reasons, but ... it acted like a marketing thing.").
129. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 51 (testimony of Senator Bill Bradley).
130. Id.
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lar laws, a federal law still is necessary. Explaining his view on the need
for federal legislation, Senator Bradley testified:
[T]hese states are finding that they are powerless to protect
thousands of their mothers. Specifically, if a woman is covered
through a self-insured plan,' 3 ' if her health insurer is headquar-
tered in another state, or if she crosses state lines to receive her
health care, then she is not protected by her state's law prohibit-
ing drive-through deliveries.132
Senator Bradley's testimony has proven to be accurate. Women are
discovering that the new laws are not applicable to their insurance plan
and are surprised that they are not covered by the law under their partic-
ular health plan. 33 Even insurers who are giving their patients the "gift"
of an extra day in the hospital are sending the bill to the doctors. 34
President Clinton agreed with Senators Bradley and Kassebaum, citing
the need for such a bill in his acceptance speech at the Democratic Na-
tional Convention, and in his State of the Union Address.'35 The bill was
signed into law on September 26, 1996.136
131. See Devon P. Groves, ERISA Waivers and State Health Care Reform, 28 COLUM. J.
L. & Soc. PROBS. 609, 616 n.37 ("Self-insured employee benefit plans are those in which
the funds for coverage are collected and saved up by the employer, thus negating the need
to pay premiums to an outside insurer."); William J. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption
of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62.
TEX. L. REV. 1313, 1315 n.7 (1984) ("Employee benefit plans and insurance companies
often look alike, because both seek to provide groups of persons with financial protection
against defined risks in defined ways.").
132. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 52 (testimony of Senator Bradley). Senator
Bradley characterized this problem as "gaping loopholes." Id. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 147-62 for a discussion on how the gaping holes in state legislation are a result of
ERISA.
133. Jennifer Preston, 48 Hour Maternity Law has Exceptions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1995, at 30.
134. Id.
135. See President William J. Clinton, Address at the Democratic National Convention,
(Sept. 4, 1996) (transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, U.S. Newswire File); Presi-
dent William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address (Feb. 4, 1997) (transcript available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File). While approving the measure to stop
"drive-through deliveries," President Clinton went on to say that new measures were
needed to end the practice of sending women home just hours after a mastectomy. Id.
Physicians, legislators, and others who are opposed to mandating minimum stays for proce-
dures may be concerned over a suggestion that other procedures merit consideration. See
infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
136. Newborns' and Mothers' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874
(1996).
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A. The Potential for Other Similar Legislation
As Wickline13 7 and Wilson 1 38 demonstrate, early discharge occurs in
other settings besides postpartum stays. In her testimony before the Sen-
ate, Dr. Palma E. Formica, a member of the American Medical Associa-
tion's Board of Trustees, stated that the American Medical Association
("AMA") is often most in opposition to "congressional intervention into
a physician's clinical decision making.' 139 The AMA is supporting this
legislation because it specifically is in the "postpartum context.'
140
Other physicians also have expressed concern over this type of legisla-
tion. 14 1 One physician criticized that mandating longer stays for particu-
lar procedures does not make sense, "'[o]nce you start with that, where
do you stop? Total hip replacements and knees? What about prostates?
There's no end to it.""' 142 Some commentators have even characterized
this issue as "the '90s version of politicians kissing babies.' 43 Still others
have urged legislators to wait before passing such legislation, arguing that
further research is necessary.'"
B. ERISA's Impact on State Legislation
1. ERISA in General
Insurance legislation by the state is affected by the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").145  Because of particular
ERISA provisions, insurance companies not located in a state with mini-
mum hospital stay legislation, as well as self-insured employers, do not
have to comply with those state laws. 146 The first provision of ERISA is a
137. Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
138. Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
139. Senate Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony of Palma E. Formica, M.D., AMA,
Board of Trustees).
140. Id.
141. Position paper from Maryland Association of Health Maintenance Organizations,
Inc., to Maryland State Senate Finance Committee (Mar. 9, 1995) (on file with author).
142. Carol M. Ostrom, Doctors: Moms Need Longer Hospital Stays- State Pediatrics
Group Setting Guidelines for Early Discharge, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 23, 1995, at B2.
143. Linda A. Johnson, Bills Would Lengthen Maternity Ward Stays, AUSTIN AMERI-
CAN-STATESMAN, July 17, 1995, at Al.
144. Dunstan McNichol, HMOs Stop 48-Hour Care Plan, RECORD, Mar. 24, 1995, at
A3 (Trenton, N.J.). Leah Ziskin, assistant commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Health, urged lawmakers to postpone enactment of their bill until the department finished
compiling information about births in the state. Id.
145. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as needed at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
146. Senate Hearings, supra note 2 (testimony of Senator Bill Bradley).
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broadly interpreted "preemption clause" that reaches "any and all State
laws insofar as they ... relate to any employee benefit plan. ' 147 ERISA
contains a large amount of substantive regulation of employee pension
plans, but minimal regulation of health plans. 148  Therefore, the statute
preempts without providing much in the way of guidance. 149 ERISA was
enacted in order to protect employees from the abuse and misuse of em-
ployee health and retirement funds experienced as a result of unscrupu-
lous business practices, questionable administration, and weak
financing.150 Therefore, the reach of ERISA is necessarily broad in order
to cover employee benefit plans nationwide and to provide for
uniformity.S'
The next provision, the "savings clause,' 52 at first glance seems to give
states the right to regulate all insurance. There is a catch-an employer
must purchase an insurance contract to fall within the reach of the state.
As a member of an insured plan, the employer directly purchases health
care coverage from an insurance company and pays a premium for the
coverage.153 A self-funded plan is out of the state's reach because no
insurance contract is purchased; instead, the employer sets money aside
in a plan to pay employee claims as they arise.' 54 Finally, the "deemer
clause"'155 generally prevents states from labeling employee benefit plans
147. Section 1144(a) of ERISA provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of the section, the provisions of this sub-
chapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan de-
scribed in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of
this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
148. Peter Schmidt, Part I. The Basics of ERISA as It Relates to Health Plans, 162 EM-
PLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST. 3 (1995).
149. Id. at 3-4.
150. MARTIN WALD & DAVID E. KENTY, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE §§ 1.2,
1.3 (1991).
151. Schmidt, supra note 148, at 4. See also PATRICIA A. BUTLER, J.D., NATIONAL
GOVERNORS' Ass'N, ROADBLOCK TO REFORM: ERISA IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE
HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES 3 (1994) (noting that Congress prohibited state regulation even
though federal law was silent, and there would be no direct inconsistency in order to main-
tain uniformity).
152. Section 1144(b)(2)(A) reads, in pertinent part, "nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insur-
ance, banking, or securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
153. Schmidt, supra note 148, at 5.
154. Id. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)
(noting the difference between insured and uninsured plans).
155. See Schmidt, supra note 148, at 5; 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (stating that employee
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as insurance plans in order to attempt regulation. 156 This clause clarifies
the limits of the "savings clause."
The broad reach of ERISA has become clear to mothers in states with
minimum hospital stay legislation. For example, after passing minimum
hospital stay legislation, some New Jersey residents were surprised to
learn that they were not protected. After giving birth, one New Jersey
resident spent the afternoon on the phone in an effort to stay one more
day in the hospital.157 Her employer was self-insured, however, so it was
not covered by the New Jersey law.' 58 Some self-insured employers, not
covered by the legislation, have chosen nonetheless to abide by it in an
effort to show their support for employee welfare. 59
Congress intended ERISA's preemption to be read broadly. 6 ' Indeed,
Senator Bradley's testimony before the Senate acknowledged that state
laws concerning minimum stays for mothers and newborns would fall di-
rectly under ERISA.161 New Jersey already has experienced difficulties
in enforcement of its law due to out-of-state insurers or those who fall
under ERISA. 62
2. ERISA in the Context of Claims Against a Utilization Review
Provider
One recent case illustrates the effects ERISA has over a plaintiff's
claims of negligence against utilization review administrators in the con-
text of a denial of a hospital stay. In Corcoran v. United Health Care,1 63
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA
preempted the parents' medical malpractice claim against the provider of
utilization review services.
welfare benefit plans shall not "be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer...
or to be engaged in the business of insurance" in order for a state to attempt legislation).
156. Schmidt, supra note 148, at 5.
157. Preston, supra note 133, at 30.
158. Id. In addition, state statutes do not extend to insurance policies written outside of
the state, so the many employees who commute to New York or Philadelphia from New
Jersey are not covered by the New Jersey law through their employer's plans. Id.
159. Id. (Johnson & Johnson chose to comply with the New Jersey legislation).
160. Schmidt, supra note 148, at 4. See also HCA Health Serv. of Va. v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 1992) (Tilley, J., concurring, a preemption inquiry
under ERISA is made by first analyzing the elements of the state law claim to determine if
it "relates to" a specific pension or welfare benefit plan provision).
161. Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 7 (testimony of Senator Bill Bradley).
162. Preston, supra note 133, at 30 (The New Jersey law, as well as other state laws, has
loopholes.).
163. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 812 (1992).
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Plaintiff, Florence B. Corcoran, became pregnant early in 1989.164 In
July, her obstetrician, Dr. Jason Collins, recommended that she have
complete bed rest for the remainder of her pregnancy. 165 When Corco-
ran applied to her employer for temporary disability benefits, she was
denied.166 Dr. Collins wrote to the employer's medical consultant, ex-
plaining that Corcoran was in a category of high risk pregnancy.
167
Although the medical consultant received a second opinion from another
obstetrician who suggested the "company would be at a considerable risk
denying her doctor's recommendation," the benefits again were
denied. 168
In early October, as Ms. Corcoran's delivery date neared, Dr. Collins
sought pre-certification from United HealthCare, Inc., the utilization re-
view contractor.1 69 Corcoran's hospitalization was denied, but she was
offered ten hours per day of home nursing care. 170 On October 25, with-
out a nurse on duty, Corcoran's fetus went into distress and died.' 7 1 The
Corcorans filed a wrongful death action in Louisiana state court, alleging
that their unborn child died as a result of various acts of negligence com-
mitted by Blue Cross and United HealthCare. 72 The defendants re-
moved the action to federal court on diversity grounds and alleged that
the action was preempted by ERISA.173 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant.1 74
The Corcorans filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that under
ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism,1 75 compensatory damages were
stillavailable to them.176 The Corcorans claimed that equitable relief was
available under ERISA for violations of an ERISA plan or the terms of
its agreement.' 77 The district court found that equitable relief under ER-
ISA referred only to the recovery of medical expenses covered by the
164. Id. at 1322.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1332.
169. Id. at 1324.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331, 1324-25.
174. Id. at 1325.
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
176. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., No. 90-4303, 1991 WL 353841 at *1 (E.D.
La., Apr. 3, 1991).
177. Id.
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plan, not to compensatory or consequential damages for emotional dis-
tress.178 The district court entered a final judgment in favor of the de-
fendants, and the Corcorans appealed.1 79
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Louisiana courts
had not yet decided whether utilization review agents were incorporated
under Louisiana wrongful death statutes, noting "[t]he potential for im-
posing liability on these entities is only beginning to be explored, with
only one state explicitly permitting a suit based on a utilization review
company's allegedly negligent decision about medical care to go for-
ward." 8 The court then reviewed the question of ERISA preemption.
The court asserted that it is the intent of Congress that dictates whether
ERISA preempts state law.181 Commenting on the principle of ERISA
preemption, the court stated that "[i]t is by now well-established that the
'deliberately, expansive' language of this clause.., is a signal that it is to
be construed extremely broadly."'8 2 In deciding whether the plaintiffs
had a valid cause of action, the court stated that "the generally applicable
negligence-based causes of action may have an effect on an ERISA-gov-
erned plan .... The pre-emption question devolves into an assessment of
the significance of these effects."' 83 Noting that United HealthCare did
give medical advice, the court nevertheless found that such medical deci-
sions were in the "context of making a determination about the availabil-
ity of benefits under the plan," and, therefore, such decisions are
preempted by ERISA. 184
'As for the Corcorans' claim that they should be awarded extracontrac-
tual damages, the claim was denied' 85 because the court assumed that
plan beneficiaries may sue under a section of ERISA that provides for
such damages, but only as to remedies for contract actions.' 8 6 Even as-
suming a contractual relationship existed between the Corcorans and
United HealthCare, at most the plan promised to act in accordance with
178. Id.
179. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir. 1992).
180. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1327 (citing Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 222 Cal. App. 3d
660 (1990)).
181. See 4 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1
(1991).
182. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1328 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987)).
183. Id. at 1329.
184. Id. at 1331.
185. The court was troubled with the result of its holding. See infra note 188 and ac-
companying text.
186. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
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accepted standards of medical care. 18 7
The court remarked that its decision, while true to the law, left the
plaintiffs with no remedy.' 88 The court stated three reasons for its dis-
comfort. 189 First, an "important check" on the utilization review process
is eliminated by failing to factor the cost of poor decision making into
utilization review companies' decisions.19° Second, a system that com-
pensated beneficiaries who charge that treatment was based on poor de-
cisions would balance the interests of obtaining quality medical care with
those of cost-saving. 19' Third, utilization review providers such as United
HealthCare did not exist when Congress passed ERISA.' 92
Even with the knowledge that plan beneficiaries are left without a rem-
edy, the language of ERISA has not been updated and the courts can
continue to reach the same results. The Supreme Court recently let
stand, without comment, a lower court ruling that ERISA prevented a
California mother from suing her insurer for wrongful death in state court
due to the denial of an "experimental" bone marrow treatment for can-
cer.' 93 The plaintiff's attorney compared the barring of punitive and
compensatory damages by ERISA to "'a license to kill with
impunity. ,,194
3. Interpreting ERISA in the United States Supreme Court
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 95 the Supreme Court determined the mean-
187. Id. at 1337. The Supreme Court later held that ERISA ordinarily does not author-
ize suits for compensatory or punitive damages. See Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S.
Ct. 2063, 2068 (1993).
188. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. See also BUTLER, supra note 151, at 20 (describing the fact that patients may
sue their providers in a traditional state court claim, but are left in uncharted water when
attempting to resolve disputes regarding managed care, particularly utilization review).
193. Comer v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 45 F.3d 435 (9th Cir. 1994) cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 1963 (1995). Billie J. Comer argued that ERISA should not apply because she
was not bringing suit as a plan beneficiary, but as a survivor entitled to compensation. Id.
She also argued that ERISA was inapplicable because she was not suing her employer,
AT&T, but the insurer. Id. The court held that the insurer's agreement was an "integral
part of AT&T's group medical plan," therefore the agreement "relates to an employee
benefit plan" and is preempted by ERISA. Id.
194. Michael A. Hiltzik, Supreme Court Won't Allow State Suit in Death Case, L.A.
TIMES, May 16, 1995, at D3. The same type of case may be made against an insurer who is
not covered by ERISA. State plaintiffs are provided a remedy while similarly situated
federal plaintiffs are barred from bringing suit. Id.
195. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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ing of ERISA's "relate to" language in its preemption clause. Using a
plain meaning approach and the legislative history of ERISA, the Court
determined that a state law relates to a plan "if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan."19 6
In Shaw, two New York state statutes prohibited discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy in employee benefit plans, and required employers to
give sick leave benefits to employees who took leave because of preg-
nancy. 197 The defendant Delta Airlines' employee benefit package did
not provide leave for pregnancy. First, the Court determined that the
anti-discrimination statute was invalid to the extent that it prohibited
practices that are permissible under Title VII. 198 Second, the pregnancy
leave statute was preempted by ERISA in the case of multiple-benefit
plans maintained under the ERISA statute, but remained valid for plans
maintained solely under state insurance laws.199 Just as the pregnancy
leave statute was preempted by ERISA, so too the minimum hospital
stay legislation will fall.
A more recent decision by the Supreme Court puts the scope of ER-
ISA's preemption language in a new, and possibly limited light. New
York Blue Cross v. Travelers Insurance Co.,"°° involved a New York stat-
ute that required hospitals to collect surcharges from commercial insur-
ers, but not from patients covered by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan, and
provided surcharges for HMOs according to the number of medicaid re-
cipients each enrolled.2 °1
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cuomo, held for the plaintiff commer-
cial insurers, finding that, at least indirectly, the surcharges could increase
the plan CoStS.2 02 The court concluded that this effect "was enough to
trigger pre-emption" and the surcharges could not be upheld under the
196. Id. at 96-97. See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138-42
(1990) (finding that state law may be preempted even though it does not address specific
subjects covered by ERISA).
197. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88.
198. Id. at 103-04.
199. Id. at 108.
200. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
201. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1673 (citing N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c (McKinney
1993)).
202. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). For a more
detailed discussion of the case see Theodore Einhorn, Note, Reigning in ERISA Preemp-
tion? Any Willing Provider Statutes After New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Insur-
ance Co., 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 265, 274-90 (1997).
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savings clause as regulating insurance.20 3 The Second Circuit affirmed
the blanket rule that ERISA's preemption clause has a broad reach and
will preempt any state law that relates to employee benefit plans.20 4
The Supreme Court found that the surcharges make the Blue Cross/
Blue Shield plans more attractive to insurance buyers, including ERISA
plans.20 5 The appeal generated by the surcharges created an "indirect
economic effect," however, that "does not bind plan administrators.,
20 6
The surcharges simply reflect an additional cost in the plan and still per-
mit uniform administration.20 7 As a result, the level of indirect economic
effect generated by the New York statute does not fall in the face of ER-.
ISA's preemption clause.20 8
Statutes that mandate certain policy benefits such as minimum hospital
stays, however, have a more direct effect on ERISA plans. In Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,20 9 the Court recognized that state
insurance laws requiring minimal mental health care benefits directly af-
fected employee welfare benefit plans.210 Insurance policies purchased
by employers are subject to extensive state regulation, and a subclass of
that regulation is mandated benefit laws that require an insurer to cover
specific illnesses or procedures.21'
The appellant insurance companies argued that "traditional laws" di-
rectly regulating the insurer or that regulate the way the insurance con-:
tracts are sold are saved from preemption by the savings clause, but that
substantive regulations are preempted by ERISA.212 The Court dis-
agreed because this would make the savings clause surplus language.2:
3
The law therefore was applicable to insurance plans and sustainable
under the savings clause.214 The Court stated that it was aware that its
holding created a distinction between insured and uninsured (self-in-;
sured) plans that left the former open to indirect regulation while the
latter are not. But as the statute is written, this is the distinction Congress
203. Travelers Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. at 1003-08.
204. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 718 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
205. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1683.
209. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
210. Id. at 732.
211. Id. at 727-28.
212. Id. at 741.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 744.
Drive- Through Deliveries
has created.215
Clearly, requiring insurers to provide for mandatory minimum hospital
stays is a substantive regulation that directly effects insurance plans. Met-
ropolitan Life spokesquarely on this issue. The mandatory minimum
hospital stays for infants and mothers will apply to employee benefit
plans that purchase insurance but not to self-insured plans.
IV. CONCLUSION
As long as the existing state and proposed federal legislation mirror
one another, families are guaranteed uniform protection. If one state de-
cides to make its laws stricter than the federal mandate, however, the
problem of ERISA preemption leaves little room for effective state laws.
A federal law mandating minimum hospital stays would prevent an ER-
ISA plan from avoiding compliance with similar laws within a state.
Once a plan complies with the standards, however, there is still no avail-
able remedy for any 'beneficiary injured as a result of cost containment
measures such as utilization review.
Congress and the states cannot continue to set mandatory hospital
stays for individual medical procedures. The sheer volume of medical
procedures and resulting inflexibility makes this approach impractical.
Therefore, ERISA must be updated to reflect the changes in American
health care. Utilization review procedures must be accounted for in the
context of ERISA preemption. Moreover, unless follow-up visits are fol-
lowed rigorously by insurance companies and strictly enforced by the
states, such visits are ineffective. Procedures must be established to en-
sure that infants are receiving the follow-up care they require; plan bene-
ficiaries deserve a remedy.
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